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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
After being laid off :from the paralegal position she had held for over four years due to a 
slow down in her employer's work, Claimant/Appellant Terri Boyd-Davis ("Boyd-Davis") 
applied for and began receiving the unemployment benefits to which she was entitled. After a 
diligent search for a new job, she was reemployed in less than three months. During her short 
period of unemployment, the Idaho Department of Labor ("IDOL" or "Department") cut offher 
benefits for a period of three weeks not because she was not entitled to those benefits but 
because she did not respond to IDOL's request for additional information by the deadline 
specified in the letter IDOL purportedly mailed to her but which Boyd-Davis did not receive. 
Upon receiving notice that her unemployment benefits had been discontinued and being 
given a deadline in which to protest this decision, Boyd-Davis submitted her Protest of 
Determination by the deadline provided. She received an email :from the IDOL and spoke with a 
representative on the telephone, providing the information it required :from her her work search 
contacts for a particular week. The information she then provided was deemed adequate by the 
IDOL and her benefits were restored effective March 31,2013. Her benefits were not restored 
for the three-week period prior to that date, however. 
Boyd-Davis appealed the IDOL's decision to deny her benefits for the three-week period. 
After a telephonic hearing before the Appeals Examiner, a Decision was issued confirming the 
denial of Boyd-Davis' V"' .• "Uh' stated issue the Decision was "whether the claimant 
failed to provide infonnation pertaining to the on-line eligibility review, according to §72-
1366(1) ofthe Idaho Employment Security Law." Although in its Findings of Fact, the 
Examiner found that Boyd-Davis had provided the information requested, Boyd-Davis' benefits 
for the three-week period were not restored because she had not provided them by the deadline 
contained in the letter she had not received. The Examiner acknowledged Boyd-Davis' assertion 
that she had not received the letter, but the Examiner relied upon Idaho Code §72-1368(5) in 
determining that "[ u ]nder Idaho law, service by mail is deemed complete on the date of mailing," 
and accordingly determined that the letter was deemed served on Boyd-Davis. 
Boyd-Davis challenges the applicability of §72-1368(5) to the facts of this case, arguing 
that its presumptions of service do not apply to the letter purportedly mailed to her by the IDOL 
but that it applies specifically and solely to the notices delineated in that statute. Boyd-Davis 
timely appealed the Decision of the Appeals Examiner to the Idaho Industrial Commission 
("Commission"), urging a literal interpretation of the unambiguous statute and entreating it to 
"liberally construe the Employment Security Law to the end that is purpose be accomplished." 
The Commission, however, affirmed the Decision of the IDOL. Boyd-Davis filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration ofthe Decision and Order issued by the Commission. Her Motion for 
Reconsideration was denied. The Order Denying Request for Reconsideration stated that "the 
Commission has rejected Claimant's restrictive interpretation ofIdaho Code Section 72-
1368(5)." 
Boyd-Davis appeals from the Commission's Order Denying Request for Reconsideration 
and asks Idaho Court to properly interpret the applicable law and to ensure 
purpose of the Idaho Employment Law is accomplished. She implores high court to liberally 
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construe the law and ensure that the funds set aside to pay benefits to the citizens of this state 
who, like Boyd-Davis, are unemployed through no fault of their own, are used for this purpose 
rather than allowing the IDOL to apply stringent standards, unsupported by Idaho law in denying 
benefits to those who are eligible to receive them. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
1. On March 27,2013, Boyd-Davis mailed to IDOL a "Protest of Determination" of 
the "Eligibility Determination" dated March 19,2013 that had been sent to her by the IDOL in 
which she was first infonned that her unemployment benefits had been revoked. (Ex. 6). 
2. On April 9, 2013, the Appeals Bureau of the IDOL mailed a "Notice of Telephone 
Hearing" to Boyd-Davis. (Ex. 1). 
3. A telephonic hearing was held on April 18, 2013. On Apri119, 2013, a Decision 
of Appeals Examiner was issued confirming the denial of Boyd-Davis' benefits. (R., p. 1-5). 
4. On May 3,2013, Boyd-Davis filed an Appeal of Decision of Appeals Examiner 
with the Idaho Industrial Commission. (R., p. 6-11). 
5. On July 25,2013, the Idaho Industrial Commission issued its Decision and Order 
affirming the Decision of the Appeals Examiner. (R., p. 16-20). 
6. On August 14,2013, Boyd-Davis filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 
Decision and Order issued by the Commission. CR., p. 21-36). 
7. On September 9,2013, the Commission issued its Order Denying Request for 
Reconsideration. CR., 38-41). 
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8. On October 18,2013, Boyd-Davis filed a Notice of Appeal with the Commission 
wherein she appealed this matter to the Idaho Supreme Court. (R., p. 42-44). 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. Appellant Terri Boyd-Davis, a resident of Hayden, Idaho, was employed as a 
paralegal by Macomber Law, PLLC ("Macomber Law") located in Coeur d' Alene, Idaho from 
October 2008 through January 2013. 
2. Boyd-Davis was laid off from her job with Macomber Law on January 27,2013 
due solely to a slow down in work. 
3. Boyd-Davis applied for unemployment benefits ("DE benefits") from the Idaho 
Department of Labor on January 27,2013. 
4. The IDOL found that Boyd-Davis was eligible for DE benefits, and after the 
passage of the waiting week, Boyd-Davis began to receive her weekly benefits. 
5. Boyd-Davis sought reemployment and on a weekly basis, she completed the 
required report through IDOL's website in order to continue to receive her DE benefits. 
6. On March 6, 2013, the IDOL alleges that it mailed a letter, identified in its bottom 
left-hand corner as an "Online Review Letter" to Boyd-Davis' horne address ("Online Review 
Letter"). The letter appears to be a computer-generated fonn letter. It is not signed by anyone. 
It does not indicate whom within the IDOL it is from. It does not have a certificate of mailing 
attached to it. The letter states: "You have been selected to provide additional infonnation 
concerning your unemployment insurance claim for the week ending 03/02/2013. It states: 
4 
"You must provide this information by 5 :00 p.m. (Mountain Time Zone) on 03115/2013. Failure 
to complete the process by this date and time will result in your benefits being denied." (Ex. 3). 
7. Boyd-Davis did not receive the Online Review Letter. (Tr., p. 8, L. 19-23). 
8. On or about March 21,2013, Boyd-Davis received in the mail from the IDOL a 
document entitled "Eligibility Determination," Form 57-961 with a listed "date of mailing" of 
03/19/2013 and a listed "last day to protest" of 04/0212013. It included a "Decision," which 
stated: 
The evidence in the record establishes the claimant has failed to complete the online 
eligibility review necessary to maintain continued eligibility. The claimant is ineligible 
for benefits effective 03/1012013 and continuing until such time as the claimant contacts 
the Idaho Department of Labor office shown above. 
It also included a "Summary of Facts," which stated: "The claimant failed to complete 
the required eligibility review. This is a requirement to maintain continued eligibility." 
It also included a "Law" section, which stated: "If a claimant fails to provide the 
Department with all necessary information pertinent to eligibility, the claimant may be denied 
benefits until the information is provide." (Emphasis added.) 
Under another section entitled "Protest Rights," it stated: If you disagree with this 
determination, you have fourteen (14) days from the date of mailing to file a protest." (Ex. 5). 
9. On March 27, 2013, Boyd-Davis prepared and mailed to IDOL a "Protest of 
Determination." In her Protest, she stated that "to knowledge, [she has] provided IDOL 
with all information requested of [her]." She additionally stated, "If the IDOL 
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additional infonnation from me, please identify what that infonnation is so that I may provide it. 
I am confused as to what the 'required eligibility review' even is." (Ex. 6). 
10. As she had done every week since she began receiving UE benefits, on March 29, 
2013, Boyd-Davis logged onto the IDOL website to complete her weekly report. The system 
would not allow her to access the report. (Tr., p. 10, L. 15-22). 
11. On March 29,2013, Boyd-Davis received an email from the IDOL. The email 
asked her to call the IDOL on Monday, April 1. Boyd-Davis phoned the IDOL on April 1 and 
provided her work search contacts, which was the additional infonnation the IDOL sought from 
her. The IDOL found that the work search contacts she provided were adequate. (Tr., p. 6, L. 
11-23). 
12. The IDOL representative that Boyd-Davis spoke with on the telephone on March 
29 infonned her that her benefits would be reinstated but that there would be a three-week period 
during which she would not receive benefits. She also told Boyd-Davis that the reason the 
system would not allow her to complete her online report was because she had not provided 
infonnation regarding her work contacts by the date requested in the Online Review Letter. (Tr., 
p. 9, L. 17-25, p. 10, L. 1-13). Boyd-Davis' UE benefits were denied effective March 10 through 
March 30,2013. (Tr., 7, L. 4-5). 
13. On April 9, 2013, the Appeals Bureau of the IDOL mailed a "Notice Telephone 
Hearing" to Boyd-Davis. Attached to the Notice was a Certificate of Service, which celiified 
that the Notice was mailed on April 2013 to Boyd-Davis, to Macomber Law, and to IDOL to 
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the attention of "Claims Specialist. The Certificate of Service was signed by the person who 
mailed it. (Ex. 1). 
14. A telephonic hearing was held on April 18, 2013. Boyd-Davis participated in the 
telephonic hearing from her place of employment because she had by then obtained a new job. 
(Tr., p. 9, L. 23-24). 
15. During the hearing, Boyd-Davis was asked by the Examiner whether she has had 
any problems with mail delivery at her address. Boyd-Davis said that she had problems with the 
mail at times. She explained that she has a mailbox at the end of her driveway and that 
sometimes the mail carriers put mail in her box that belongs to other people and when that 
happens, she puts the mail back in the mailbox, stating "not at this address." She said she was 
sure the same thing probably happens with mail intended for her. When asked by the Examiner 
if she had ever filed a complaint with the post office, Boyd-Davis responded that she had 
contacted the post office in the past but that it had probably been a year or two since she had 
done that. (Tr., p. 11, L. 6-23). 
16. Boyd-Davis explained to the Examiner during the hearing that "there would be no 
reason for [her] to not have provided [the work search contacts to the IDOL] by the date on the 
[Online Review Letter]" but that she "simply was not aware that it was being asked of[her], 
which is why once [she] did realize that was being asked, [she] provided it. She emphasized 
that she "certainly would not have just neglected that, knowing that [her] benefits ... would be 
.. [she] was certainly needed [her] benefits." p. 12, L. 8-
16). 
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17. The total VE benefits that Boyd-Davis received during her time of unemployment 
was seven weeks worth of benefits. She did not receive three weeks worth of benefits for the 
period of March 10-30,2013 for the reason that she had not provided her work search contacts 
by the date provided in the Online Review Letter. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a decision of the Industrial Commission, this Court freely reviews 
questions of law. Uhl v. Ballard Med. Prod., Inc., 138 Idaho, 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 
(2003). 
The reviewing court may reverse or modify the agency act or decision if substantial rights 
of the parties have been prejudiced by administrative findings which violate constitutional or 
statutory provisions, or are in excess of authority, or made upon unlawful procedure, or are 
clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or capricious. Greenfield Village Apts. v. Ada County, 130 Idaho 
207,209,938 P.2d 1245, 1247 (1997). 
The Court exercises free review over all questions of law and any legal conclusions 
reached by the agency. See Qualman v. State Department of Employment, 129 Idaho 92, 922 
P.2d 389 (1996); Crooks v. Inland 465 Ltd. Partnership, 129 Idaho 43, 921 P.2d 743 (1996). 
Erroneous conclusions of law made by an agency may be corrected on appeal. See Love 
v. Board of County Comm 'rs of Bingham County, 105 Idaho 558, 6721 P.2d 417 (1983). 
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III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Industrial Commission err when it found that mailings other than those 
specifically delineated in Idaho Code §72-1368(5) are entitled to a presumption of service 
pursuant to this section? 
2. Did the Industrial Commission err when it determined that Idaho Code §72-
1368( 5) should not be interpreted according to its plain and clear language? 
3. Did the decision by the Department of Labor and upheld by the Industrial 
Commission to deny claimant her benefits defeat the purpose of the Idaho Employment Security 
Law as defined in Idaho Code §72-1302? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
The Idaho Department of Labor denied unemployment benefits to Claimant! Appellant 
Terri Boyd-Davis for a three-week period from March 10 - March 30, 2013. On January 27, 
2013, Boyd-Davis was laid off from the paralegal job that she had held for over four years when 
her employer experienced a slowdown in business. She immediately applied for UE benefits, 
was found eligible for benefits, and began receiving benefits after the one-week waiting period 
had passed. She received benefits for five weeks, then the IDOL cut her benefits for three 
weeks. When her benefits were restored on March 30,2013, she continued to receive benefits 
for another two weeks until 
then ceased. 
obtained new employment April, at which time her benefits 
reason why Boyd-Davis did not receive benefits tor three weeks in the midst of her 
period of unemployment was not because IDOL found her to be ineligible for benefits; rather, it 
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was solely because IDOL found she had "fail[ed] to timely provide information regarding her 
work search contacts." (R., p. 2). IDOL acknowledges that Boyd-Davis did provide the 
information regarding her work search contacts and further acknowledges that the information 
she provided was deemed adequate. The key issue here is IDOL's assertion that the infonnation 
she provided was not timely. 
Boyd-Davis asserts that the only reason she did not provide the information by IDOL's 
deadline was because she never received the letter IDOL purportedly sent to her that provided 
the deadline by which she was required to provide the requested infonnation. Thus, this case 
revolves around whether Boyd-Davis was required to provide information by a date contained in 
a letter that Boyd-Davis claims she never received. 
The position of the IDOL and the Idaho Industrial Commission is that Boyd-Davis' 
contention that she never received the letter is not relevant because it is their position that 
pursuant to Idaho Code 72-1368(5), the letter was deemed served on the date of mailing. 
Boyd-Davis contends that the IDOL and the Commission have wrongly applied this 
section ofldaho's Employment Law to the facts of this case. Boyd-Davis asserts that Idaho 
Code 72-1368(5) is an unambiguous statute that applies only to the notices it specifically 
delineates by name. She argues that the IDOL and the Commission have erred in their statutory 
interpretation of Idaho law. She additionally argues that the rigorous standards the IDOL has 
demanded of her in this case - in a situation where the Department had leeway- have resulted in 
defeating the very purpose of Idaho's Employment Law. 
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A. Idaho Code section §72-1368(5) applies specifically and exclusively to service 
of the five notices enumerated therein and the Online Review Letter 
purportedly mailed to Boyd-Davis by the Department of Labor on March 6, 
2013 is not entitled to the same presumption of service. 
After conducting a hearing to detennine ifthe IDOL had properly denied UE benefits to 
Boyd-Davis, the Appeals Examiner affinned the Eligibility Detennination dated March 29,2013 
wherein those benefits had been denied. (R., p. 1). In the Decision issued by the Appeals 
Examiner, the stated issue was "whether the claimant failed to provide infonnation pertaining to 
the on-line eligibility review, according to §72-1366(1) of the Idaho Employment Security Law." 
Relevant to this appeal were the "Conclusions" of law outlined in the Decision of the Appeals 
Examiner as follows: 
The claimant asserts that she did not receive the [Online Review Letter]. Under 
Idaho law, service by mail is deemed complete on the date of mailing. Idaho 
Code 72-1368(5) (2004). In Striebeck v. Employment Security Agency, 83 Idaho 
531,366 P.2d 589, (1961), the Idaho Supreme Court held "[i]t is clear that the 
legislature intended that for the purpose of perfecting an appeal as provided in 72-
1368, service of a notice of detennination or redetennination shall be regarded 
and adjudged complete when delivered to the person being served on the date of 
mailing if mailed to such person at his last known address." Such presumptions 
also apply here. 
(R., p. 2). (Emphasis added.) 
The Examiner then explained further: 
The presumption that the notice was mailed and received is rebuttable, 
nevertheless, a party's unsupported argument that he or she did not receive it is 
insufficient to rebut the presumption. Striebeck v. Emplovment Security Agency, 
83 Idaho 531, at 536, 366 P.2d 589, 591 (1961). There is nothing in the record 
that would lead the Appeals Examiner to the conclusion that the claimant was the 
victim of an error of the U.S. Postal Service. As the claimant did not [] provide 
the infonnation by the deadline benefits are denied for the weeks immediately 
preceding the date in which the claimant provided the requested infonnation. 
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(R., pp. 2-3). 
Boyd-Davis appealed the decision of the IDOL to the Idaho Industrial Commission 
wherein she argued that the Appeals Examiner relied upon a section of the Idaho Code and Idaho 
case law that concern appellate procedure and are inapplicable to the issue of this case. (R., pp. 
8-9). The Commission issued its Decision and Order on July 25,2013, in which it upheld the 
decision of the Appeals Examiner of the IDOL. In its Decision, the Commission stated what it 
found to be the "real issue in this case," which is "whether Claimant can be held accountable for 
failing to comply with the Department's request when she did purportedly not receive the 
Department's letter regarding that request." (R., p. 18). Relying on the same section of Idaho 
law as the IDOL had done, the Commission stated, "Idaho Code 72-1368(5) defines service. 'A 
notice shall be deemed served if delivered to the person being served or if mailed to his last 
known address; service by mail shall be deemed complete on the date of mailing.'" (Id.). 
The section ofIdaho law on which the IDOL relied in denying benefits to Boyd-Davis 
and which the Commission affirmed applied to this case is Idaho Code 72-1368(5), which 
provides as follows: 
All interested parties shall be entitled to prompt service of notice of 
determinations, revised detenninations, redeterminations, special redetenninations 
and decisions. A notice shall be deemed served if delivered to the person being 
served, if mailed to his last known address or if electronically transmitted to him 
at his request and with the department's approval. Service by mail shall be 
deemed complete on the date of mailing. Service by electronic transmission shall 
be deemed complete on the date notice is electronically transmitted. 
(Emphasis added). 
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While Boyd-Davis does not deny that this section "defines service" as the Commission 
asserts, she does deny that it applies to letters mailed by the IDOL and, thus, that it applies to the 
facts of this case. It applies to notices. This statute is in no way ambiguous; its meaning is clear. 
\Ve can easily detennine from it that "all interested parties are entitled to prompt service." The 
question is - prompt service of what? That is also clear. Interested parties are entitled to prompt 
service of notices. The next question is - to what notices does this apply? That is also clear and 
spelled out. It lists by name the five notices to which this section applies, as follows: 
"detenninations, revised detenninations, redetenninations, special redetenninations and 
decisions." Absent from this list are "Online Review Letters" or any letters for that matter. 
When this section then immediately states that "[a] notice shall be deemed served," it is 
abundantly clear it is referring solely and specifically to the five notices it just delineated by 
name. 
In its attempt to support its denial of benefits to Boyd-Davis based on Section 72-
1368(5), the IDOL further erred in its reliance upon the Striebeck case. In Striebeck, this Court 
stated that the presumption of service applied "for the purpose of perfecting an appeal as 
provided in 72-1368." (Emphasis added.) Striebeck v. Employment Security Agency, 83 Idaho 
531,534,366 P.2d 589,592 (1961). At the time when the Online Review Letter was purportedly 
mailed, it was prior to any appeal being filed and, thus, again this does not apply to this situation. 
When the IDOL Examiner stated in its Decision that "[t]here is nothing in the record that 
lead the Appeals Examiner to the conclusion that the claimant was the victim an error 
U.S. Postal Service," IS p. 3). Boyd-Davis testified that she did not 
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receive the letter. (Tr., p. 8, L. 19-23). Boyd-Davis also testified that in the past she had had 
problems with mail being delivered to the wrong address. (Tr., p. 11, L. 6-23). From that 
testimony, the Examiner could have concluded (or simply given Boyd-Davis the benefit of the 
doubt) that she was a "victim of an error of the U.S. Postal Service." To say that "there is 
nothing in the record" to lead to the conclusion that the mail was not delivered to Boyd-Davis is 
to say that Boyd-Davis' testimony was not believed because Boyd-Davis certainly testified to 
this fact. It appears that the statement "there is nothing in the record" means, rather, that there 
was no proof that the Online Review Letter was not received. But how is one supposed to 
"prove" that she "was the victim of an error of the U.S. Postal Service"? How is it even possible 
to "prove" that mail was not received? It simply is not possible to do so. 
The Commission confused the issue of this case when it stated that "Claimant has the 
burden of proving her eligibility for benefits by a preponderance of the evidence whenever the 
claim is questioned." (R., p. 18). The IDOL, however, acknowledges that Boyd-Davis proved 
her eligibility for benefits. In its Findings of Fact No.4, it found that she "provided the 
information" and that the infOlmation provided was "appropriate." (R., p. 2). The IDOL denied 
her UE benefits solely because Boyd-Davis "did not [] provide the information by the deadline 
[provided in the Online Review Letter]." (R., p. 3). And, in fact, the Commission itself agreed 
that the "real issue in this case" was "whether Claimant can be held accountable for failing to 
comply with the Department's request when she did purportedly not receive the Department's 
letter regarding that request." (R., p. 18). 
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In this case, apparently because Boyd-Davis could not prove she had not received the 
Online Review Letter, her testimony was disregarded and the IDOL used a statute and case law 
that apply to notices in the appeal process to determine that the letter was deemed served and that 
the Department was, therefore, justified in denying her benefits. It decided this even though it 
admits that she was eligible for benefits, that she provided the infonnation the Department 
sought, and that the information she provided was deemed adequate, and even though the Idaho 
Administrative Rule that applies here - IDAPA 09.01.30.425.07 - allows discretion in denial of 
benefits. It states that "[i]f a claimant fails to provide the Department with all necessary 
infonnation pertinent to eligibility, the claimant may be denied benefits until the infonnation is 
provided." (Emphasis added.) 
1. The Industrial Commission erred in its interpretation of Idaho law when it 
applied a meaning to Idaho Code 72-1368(5) other than that provided by 
its plain and clear meaning. 
In its Decision wherein it upheld the IDOL's denial of Boyd-Davis' UE benefits, the 
Commission accurately clarified Boyd-Davis' argument, stating, "Claimant contends that Idaho 
Code 72-1368(5) only applies to Determinations and Decision and therefore does not cover the 
letter dated March 6,2013 regarding the audit." (R., p. 18). In its Decision, the Commission 
states: 
Claimant advocates a very literal interpretation of Idaho Code 72-1368(5) 
definition of service. Her interpretation would imply that only Decisions and 
Determinations are entitled to the presumption of receipt by the intended party if 
sent to the address of record. Any other official correspondence would not be 
entitled to that same presumption. Claimant's interpretation does not reflect 
reality of the Department's day-to-day business processes. 
15 
(Id.) 
In dismissing Boyd-Davis' argument that this statute says what it means and means what 
it says, the Commission attempted to force this statute to to apply to the Online Review Letter 
purportedly mailed by the Department to Boyd-Davis so it would apparently then "reflect the 
reality ofthe Department's day-to-day business processes." The Commission found that "[t]he 
'letter' IDOL sent Claimant informing her that she had been selected for an audit of her work 
seeking activities was prepared and mailed using the same process that IDOL uses for preparing 
and mailing Determinations." The first problem with this finding is that there is no evidence in 
the record that this statement is true. No one testified as to "the process" IDOL uses for 
preparing and mailing letters or Determinations. The second and more significant problem with 
this finding is that, simply put, the law on which the Commission relies applies to notices of 
detennination but does not apply to letters sent pre-appeal. 
While the Commission states that the "same process" is used by the Department to mail 
letters as to mail detenninations, it provides no support for this statement and provides no 
citation to the record from which we are to reach this conclusion. We are only able to make 
assumptions as to "the process" that was used by the IDOL in purportedly "preparing and 
mailing" the March 6, 2013 "Online Review Letter" by reviewing a copy of the letter itself 
(Exhibit 3). A review of the letter shows that: 1) No one signed the letter; 2) There is no 
indication as to who prepared or mailed the letter; and 3) There is no Certificate of Service 
attached to the letter. It is simply what appears to be a computer-generated form letter. We 
don't know who purportedly mailed the letter and no testimony was provided by anyone 
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asserting to have mailed this letter. An "assistant manager" ofthe IDOL testified during the 
telephone hearing as to what the IDOL's records reflected was done by the Department's staff. 
Her testimony was based on her review of the exhibits provided. (Tr., p. 5, L. 12-25, p. 6, L. 1-
14). Exhibit 4, p. 2 indicates that on 3/5/13 "Work Search Verification Letter Generated." The 
IDOL and the Commission have assumed that it was mailed and, despite Boyd-Davis' testimony 
that she never received it, they have further assumed that there was no error in delivery by the 
Post Office. 
a) In construing an unambiguous statute, it should be given its plain, 
usual and ordinary meaning. 
Chapter 1 of Title 73 ofthe Idaho Code is entitled "Construction of Statutes." In Section 
73-113(1) it explains the proper "[c]onstruction of words and phrases" in Idaho statutes as 
follows: 
The language of a statute should be given its plain, usual and ordinary meaning. 
Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the expressed intent of the legislature 
shall be given effect without engaging in statutory construction. The literal words 
of a statute are the best guide to determining legislative intent. 
The Commission takes issue with Boyd-Davis' position that nothing more should be nor 
need be read into Idaho Code 72-1368(5) because the meaning of the statute is clear. In its Order 
Denying Request for Reconsideration from which Boyd-Davis appeals, the Commission 
correctly stated that the "Claimant argues ... that the Commission should apply the literal reading 
ofIdaho Code Section 72-1368(5)." (R., p. 39). The Commission further correctly represents 
Boyd-Davis' position when it stated: "Because IDOL's notice of the audit was not a decision or 
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detennination, Claimant contends that the literal language of the statute, i.e., the service by mail 
presumption, does not apply to IDOL's audit letter." (Id.) 
It is Boyd-Davis' contention that the Commission erred in its interpretation of this statute. 
In its Order Denying Request for Reconsideration, it states: "[T]he Commission has rejected 
Claimant's restrictive interpretation of Idaho Code Section 72-1368(5)." (R., p. 39). The 
Commission apparently believes that because a "very literal interpretation" of the statute does 
not "reflect the reality of the Department's day-to-day business practices," that it is acceptable to 
force this statute to apply to situations other than those to which it clearly explains it applies. 
In Boyd-Davis' Motion for Reconsideration of Decision and Order (R., p. 21-36), she 
made the following argument: 
While there are numerous cases that make it clear that unambiguous statutes 
should be interpreted by their plain and clear language, a case that clearly 
addresses the issue here is found in Matter of Permit No. 36-7200,121 Idaho 819 
(1992). Therein, the Supreme Court states that "[t]he fundamental issue in this 
litigation is the interpretation of I.C. § 67-4308." In that case, two governmental 
agencies, the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) and the Idaho 
Department of Parks and Recreation (IDPR) attempted to force a meaning upon 
the statute that was contrary to its plain meaning, much as the Industrial 
COlmnission does in the instant case. The Idaho Supreme Court discussed the 
rules of construction of statutory intent to clarify the agencies' error ... 
Id. at 24. 
She cited directly to the Court's arguments in that case and its citation to other cases that 
confinned "[s]tatutory interpretation always begins with an examination of the literal words of 
the statute" and "[t]he clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect and there is 
no occasion for construction where the language of a statute is unambiguous. at 851-852)." 
Id. at 25. She noted that in Matter of Permit No. 36-7200 "[t]he Supreme Court upheld the 
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district court's ruling, finding the lower court was correct in interpreting the statute according to 
its plain language." rd. She pointed out that in that case, the Supreme Court stated what is 
equally applicable to this case, which is: 
Id. 
While the plain words of the statute defy the agencies' concern over the purpose 
of the statute, the purpose of an unambiguous statute is not the concern of the 
courts when attempting to interpret a statute. This Court has stated that when the 
language of a statute is definite, courts must give effect to that meaning whether 
or not the legislature anticipated the statute's result. Unitv Light & Power Co. v. 
Burley, 83 Idaho 285, 361 P .2d 788 (1961). Moreover, "[t]he wisdom, justice, 
policy, or expediency of a statute are questions for the Legislature alone .... It 
is the duty of the courts to interpret the meaning of legislative enactments 
without regard to the possible results." Beny v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170,369 
P.2d 1010 (1962). 
Id. at 853. (Emphasis added.)" 
Wnile the IDOL and the Commission sincerely want Idaho Code 72-1368(5) to apply to 
the Online Review Letter, a review of this statute and its plain and unambiguous language reveal 
that it does not. The Commission erred in "reject[ing] Claimant's restrictive interpretation of 
Idaho Code section 72-1368(5)" and erred in finding the presumption of service provided for in 
this statute applies to the Online Review Letter. (R., p. 39). 
B. The arbitrary decision by the Idaho Department of Labor to deny Boyd-
Davis the benefits to which she was entitled resulted in defeating the purpose 
for which the Idaho Employment Law was enacted. 
Boyd-Davis is representative of the exact persons for which the Idaho Employment Law 
was created order to ensure their welfare - workers who are unemployed through no fault of 
their own. Yet, the uncompromising conditions the IDOL has required of the claimant in this 
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situation have resulted in defeating the very purpose for which the Idaho Employment Law was 
enacted as stated in Idaho Code 72-1302: 
The public policy ofthis state is as follows: Economic insecurity due to 
unemployment is a serious threat to the well-being of our people. Unemployment 
is a subject of national and state concern. This chapter addresses this problem by 
encouraging employers to offer stable employment and by systematically 
accumulating funds during periods of employment to pay benefits for periods of 
unemployment. The legislature declares that the general welfare of our citizens 
requires the enactment of this measure and sets aside unemployment reserves to 
be used for workers who are unemployed through no fault oftheir own. 
In its Decision and Order wherein the Commission affirmed the IDOL's denial ofUE 
benefits to Boyd-Davis, it misstated the applicable Idaho Administrative Rule, as follows: 
To ensure that a claimant meets all ofthe requirements necessary to qualify for 
unemployment benefits, including compliance with work-seeking requirements, 
IDOL has promulgated IDAPA 09.01.30.425.07 stating that a claimant who fails 
to provide the Department with all necessary information relevant to determining 
that claimant's eligibility shall be denied benefits until such infonnation is 
provided. 
(R., pp. 17-18). (Emphasis added.) 
In fact, IDAP A 09.01.30.425.07 states that "[i]f a claimant fails to provide the 
Department with all necessary infonnation pertinent to eligibility, the claimant may be denied 
benefits until the information is provided." (Emphasis added.) The IDOL's decision to deny 
benefits in this situation is discretionary, not mandatory. In the case of Davenport v. State Dept. 
of Employment, this Court stated that, "[i]t is clearly the intent of legislation that benefits be 
granted or denied based upon matters of substance rather than mere form." Id., 650 P. 2d 634, 
636, 103 Idaho 492 (1982). 
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The instant case is a case where the IDOL has denied the claimant benefits based upon 
matter of form. Benefits were not denied to Boyd-Davis because she was not eligible to receive 
them. Benefits were not denied to her because she did not provide the information the IDOL 
requested of her. Benefits were not denied because the infonnation she provided was not 
deemed adequate. Benefits were denied because the information requested of her was not 
provided by the deadline requested in a letter that the claimant claims she never received. 
Benefits were denied because Boyd-Davis was unable to prove something that is 
impossible to prove - that she did not receive a piece of mail. Her testimony that she didn't 
receive the mail was discounted while the Department attempted to force a statute to mean 
something it does not in order to justify the IDOL's denial of benefits to her. In its Order 
Denying Request for Reconsideration, from which Boyd-Davis appeals, the Commission stated, 
"[ c ]laimant has not shown that an error of the U.S. Postal Service delayed delivery of the IDOL 
audit." Of course, she did not show that - it is impossible to show that! 
The IDOL and the Commission need to revisit the purpose of Idaho's Employment Law: 
The Employment Security Act was enacted to alleviate the hardships of 
involuntary unemployment and will be construed liberally to effectuate that 
purpose. Smith v. Department o(Employment, supra; In re Potlatch Forests, Inc., 
72 Idaho 291, 240 P.2d 242 (1952). As Justice Cardozo noted, in Chas. C. 
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593, 57 S.Ct. 883, 893, 81 L.Ed. 1279 
(1937), "[a]n unemployment law framed in such a way that the unemployed who 
look to it will be deprived of reasonable protection is one in name and nothing 
more." It is clearly the intent ofthe legislation that benefits be granted or denied 
based upon matters of substance rather than mere fonn, and the act will be 
construed to effectuate that intent. 
!d. at 636. 
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Boyd-Davis, during her short period of unemployment, looked to Idaho's Employment 
Law expecting protection and some extent of economic security. By arbitrarily denying her 
benefits when she needed them and was eligible to receive them, the purpose for which this law 
was enacted was defeated. Boyd-Davis appeals to Idaho's high court to right this wrong. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The Commission erred in its application and interpretation of the law. The IDOL held 
the claimant to an impossible standard and the Commission's decision affirming IDOL's denial 
of Claimant's benefits resulted in violating the very purpose for which of the Idaho Employment 
Law was enacted. 
The Order Denying Request for Reconsideration should be overturned and the IDOL 
should be ordered to pay to Claimant Terri Boyd-Davis the DE benefits for the period of March 
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